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ESCALATION CLAUSES IN WASHINGTON CHILD
SUPPORT AWARDS
I. INTRODUCTION
For people of average means, child support is often the most significant
issue in a dissolution action.' The duty to support children is a long term
obligation that cannot be terminated when the final decree of dissolution
is entered. 2 The traditional approach to child support, in Washington and
elsewhere, is to award a fixed dollar amount in the decree of dissolution,
with future increases dependent on the outcome of modification proceed-
ings. 3 Once decreed, however, child support awards rapidly become ob-
solete in the face of inflation. 4 As a result, the custodial parent must either
repeatedly return to court to modify the decree, which results in addi-
tional attorneys fees, court congestion, 5 and emotional trauma, or face the
prospect of increasingly inadequate support. 6
Many of the costs resulting from modification of child support awards
could be avoided by the use of escalation clauses. Properly drafted
escalation clauses can accurately and efficiently meet needs over time and
be fair to all parties concerned. 7
This comment analyzes the Washington courts' interpretation of the
statutes providing for making and modifying child support awards and the
policies these statutes are designed to effect. It concludes that the use of
escalation clauses is consistent with the statutes and policies on which the
Washington support system is based, and that the use of such clauses is a
more effective means of promoting the state's policy of providing ade-
quate child support than the traditional approach of awarding support in
fixed amounts subject to court modification. Finally, the comment sug-
gests one possible escalation device that seeks to accurately predict future
increases in child support needs.
1. Kelly, Child Support, DISsOLuTION UPDATE 5 (Law and Practice Series, Washington State Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, 1976).
2. The duty to support dependent children extends to both parents. WASH. REV. CODE §
26.16.205 (1976). At the court's discretion the duty may continue even after the child reaches age 18.
Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn. 2d 592, 605, 575 P.2d 201, 209 (1978). See generally Note, Domestic
Relations-Post-Minority Child Support in Dissolution Proceedings-Childers v. Childers, .54
WASH. L. REv. 459 (1979).
3. H. CL4RK, LAw OF DOMESTic RELATIONS 494-95 (1968).
4. P. EDEN, ESniMATING CHILD AD SPOusAL SUPPORT 5 (1977); see also Eden, How Inflation
Flaunts the Court's Order, 1 FAM. ADVOCATE 2 (1979).
5. Dissolution actions constitute the bulk of litigation in Washington. Kelly, supra note 1. at 5.
6. P. EDEN, supra note 4, at 5, 52-53.
7. See Part 111-B infra.
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II. ESCALATION CLAUSES AND THE CHILD SUPPORT
SYSTEM: STATUTES, POLICIES, AND RELEVANT
FACTORS
A. Escalation Defined
An escalation clause is any provision in a support decree that causes the
amount awarded to increase over time. The term "escalation clause" has
been used by different courts to denote at least three distinct escalation
devices. 8 In open-ended escalation, a base dollar amount of support is
awarded, and the amount of support rises by a fixed percentage of the
income increases of the supporting parent. 9 In a second form of escala-
tion, the amount of support, calculated as a fixed percent of income, 10
varies directly with fluctuations in income, with no guaranteed minimum
or maximum. A third form of escalation clause increases or decreases the
amount of the award according to fluctuation in income, but sets a fixed
dollar or percentage limit on the possible range of the award; this form is
most often used when income varies widely from year to year."
B. Child Support Escalation Under Washington Case Law
Washington case law provides little guidance for determining what is
or is not a permissible escalation clause. Indeed, only one Washington
case has squarely faced the issue. 12 In a split decision 13 and over vigorous
dissent, 14 the Washington Court of Appeals recently upheld the use of an
open-ended escalation clause in a child support decree. 15
An earlier Washington Court of Appeals decision' 6 held that when the
supporting spouse has the ability to pay increased support, and an in-
crease is in the child's best interest, an escalation provision does not bar
future modifications of the support award. 17 While the permissibility of
8. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text infra.
9. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahalingam, 21 Wn. App. 228, 232, 584 P.2d 971, 975 (1978)
(trial court ordered husband to pay child support in the amount of two hundred dollars per month.
plus 20% of net salary increases from his present or any other employer, and 10% of net income
received from any other source).
10. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 367 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
11. See, e.g., Collins v. Collins, 12 Wn. App. 85D, 532 P.2d 1185 (1975).
12. In re Marriage of Mahalingam, 21 Wn. App. 228, 584 P.2d 971 (1978).
13. The court was divided only on the escalation issue. The court unanimously rejected the four
other bases for appeal. Id. at 230-32, 584 P.2d at 974-75.
14. Id. at 237, 584 P.2d at 978 (Roe, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
15. Id. at 234, 584 P.2d at 976 (base amount increased by fixed percent of income increases).
16. Collins v. Collins, 12 Wn. App. 850, 532 P.2d 1185 (1975).
17. Id. at 855, 532 P.2d at 1188.
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using escalation clauses was not itself in issue, the decision contains some
significant comment on the proper role of escalation clauses. 18 The only
other Washington cases which'rnention escalation clauses involve the in-
terpretation of provisions escalating spousal maintenance awards in
separation agreements; 19 these cases have not questioned the propriety of
such clauses. 20
C. Child Support Awards: Policy Considerations and Relevant Factors
R.C.W. § 26.09.10021 authorizes the court, after considering all rele-
vant factors, 22 to order either or both parents to pay reasonable or neces-
18. Id. The issue in Collins was whether a graduated child support scale included in a separation
agreement was subject to modification. The agreement was concluded while the husband was 'fir-
loughed from his job and his economic prospects were uncertain. The action to modify the support
provision was brought three years after the agreement was made, long after the husband had returned
to work. Even though his income was within the scale provided for in the agreement, the court held
that it was not an abuse of discretion, in light of changed circumstances, to modify the support provi-
sion by increasing the child support payments.
The Collins opinion is significant for several reasons. First, it emphasizes the state's interest in
child support. The court modified the agreement even though at the time it was entered into the par-
ties contemplated that the husband's income would reach the level it ultimately attained, and the
agreement provided for some increase when it reached that level. Second, it demonstrates the need
for rational escalation provisions; the court noted that "a mere increase in the father's earnings is
itself of little moment unless there is a showing that the welfare and best interests of the child require
an increase of support which the increased income enables the father to pay." Id. Finally, Collins
represents the type of situation in which the statutory provision for the judicial modification of
support awards should be invoked. WASH. REv. COD § 26.09.170 (1976). See Part II-E infra (dis-
cussion of R.C.W. § 26.09.170). The true function of the modification provision should be to pro-
vide a means to alter support awards when unanticipated changes make alteration necessary. The
sliding scale escalation provision in Collins may have been reasonable when conceived, but unforsee-
able future changes necessitated modification.
19. E.g., Verde v. Verde, 78 Wn. 2d 206, 471 P.2d 84 (1970) (escalation clause based on
percentage of income increases; issue was whether it was permissible for a supporting spouse to de-
duct his new wife's community interest in his income prior to calculating the amount of alimony due);
Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wn. 2d 473, 341 P.2d 882 (1959) (support based on percent of monthly income;
issue was whether an agreement labeled as a property settlement was actually one for support).
20. However, Berry v. Berry, 50 Wn. 2d 158, 310 P.2d 223 (1957) contains dictum to the effect
that it is "proper and desirable" to tie the award to a percent of income after providing for basic
needs, though the court did not specify the considerations on which it based this conclusion. Id. at
163-64, 310 P.2d at 226.
21. The statute provides:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, declaration of invalidity, mainte-
nance, or child support, after considering all relevant factors but without regard to marital mis-
conduct, the court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to any child of the
marriage dependent upon either or both spouses to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his
support.
WASH. RE. Con § 26.09.100 (1976).
22. By express provision, marital fault is not to be considered. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.100
(1976).
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sary child support. The statute is based on the fundamental policy that all
parents have a legal duty to support their dependent children.2 3 This pol-
icy arises from a recognition of the helplessness of children to provide for
themselves, 24 and reflects the state's interest in supporting and educating
children so that they may become useful citizens. 25 Decisions
underscoring the strength of this policy are legion, 26 and the duty to sup-
port has been construed liberally in favor of children. 27
To effectuate the policy of guaranteeing adequate child support, the
Washington Supreme Court has articulated a set of factors which must be
considered in calculating the "reasonable or necessary" award required
by the statute. 28 The factors include the earnings, earning capabilities,
and economic prospects of the parents, the age and health of all the par-
ties, the family's predivorce standard of living, and the parents' ability to
maintain or enhance this standard of living subsequent to the divorce. 29
Other factors relate specifically to the child's welfare: the normal and rea-
sonable costs of clothing, medical and dental expenses, education, food,
and the incidental needs of the child. 30
The objection to escalation provisions consistently voiced by courts is
that they focus unduly on the income of the supporting spouse without
adequately considering the child's needs or the supporting spouse's abil-
23. Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn. 2d 592, 599, 575 P.2d 201, 206 (1978). The parental duty to
support dependent children has been explicitly imposed by statute in Washington since 1881. Id. at
599, 575 P.2d at 206; WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.205 (1976) (both parents are jointly and severally
liable for family expenses and children's education).
24. Puckett v. Puckett, 76 Wn. 2d 703, 706, 458 P.2d 556, 557 (1969).
25. Corson v. Corson, 46 Wn. 2d 611, 615, 283 P.2d 673, 676 (1955).
26. E.g., Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wn. 2d 100, 558 P.2d 801 (1977) (attorney's lien may not be
asserted against any portion of funds paid in satisfaction of a judgment of child support); Gaidos v.
Gaidos, 48 Wn. 2d 276, 293 P.2d 388 (1956) (duty to support is not contingent on the convenient
exercise of the right of visitation); Lear v. Lear, 29 Wn. 2d 692, 189 P.2d 237 (1948) (violation of
visitation rights not grounds for withholding support). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.160 (1976)
(failure to comply with provision of dissolution decree or temporary order does not suspend obliga-
tion to make support payments).
27. See, e.g., Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978) (trial court may impose
duty on parents of sufficient means to provide for children's college expenses); Moses v. Miller, 86
Wn. 2d 712, 548 P.2d 542 (1976) (breach of duty to support gives rise to a tort for purpose of
invoking state long-arm statute).
28. Puckett v. Puckett, 76 Wn. 2d 703, 458 P.2d 556 (1969); Garrett v. Garrett, 67 Wn. 2d
646, 409 P.2d 470 (1965).
29. Puckett v. Puckett, 76 Wn. 2d 703, 705-06, 458 P.2d 556, 557 (1969).
30. Garrett v. Garrett, 67 Wn. 2d 646, 648, 409 P.2d 470, 472 (1965). The Puckett and Garrett
factors were not altered when the current version of the child support award statute was enacted in
1973, Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract?, 49 WASH L. REV 375, 413-14
(1974), as is evidenced in their application in post-1973 decisions. See, e.g., Childers v. Childers, 89
Wn. 2d 592, 598, 575 P.2d 201, 205 (1978); In re Marriage of Mahalingam, 21 Wn. App. 228, 235,




ity to pay. 31 Absent specification of the relevant factors underlying the
terms of the clause, the objection has merit: the purpose of child mainte-
nance is to provide reasonably for a child's needs, 32 not to impose arbi-
trary burdens on the supporting spouse. 33 The objection loses all force,
however, if the factors articulated by the Washington Supreme Court for
determining reasonable or necessary awards are made mandatory
considerations in the formulation of escalation clauses, and if the clauses
are drafted in a manner calculated to be fair to all. 34
31. The failure to consider all the relevant factors has been the basis for rejecting escalation pro-
visions in several jurisdictions. The Michigan Supreme Court has upheld the use of an escalation
provision based on a percent of income with a maximum amount. Anneburg v. Anneburg, 367 Mich.
458, 116 N.W.2d 794, 796 (1962). The lower courts of appeals, however, have limited Anneburg
strictly to its facts. Hagbloom v. Hagbloom, 71 Mich. App. 257, 247 N.W.2d 373, 375 (1976) (per-
centage support permissible if upper limit established). They have also rejected escalation provisions
which focused exclusively on the paying parent's income and thereby abrogated the purpose of the
modification provision. Stanaway v. Stanaway, 70 Mich. App. 294, 245 N.W.2d 723, 724-25
(1976). The Michigan appellate courts have so ruled even in the face of statutes much broader than
those in Washington. MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 552.16 (1970) (the court may make such further decr~es
as it shall deem just and proper); id. § 552.17 (1970) (on petition the court may make a new decree as
circumstances of parents and benefit of children shall require). Courts in other jurisdictions have also
found escalation clauses objectionable because they focus unduly on only a few relevant factors.
McManus v. McManus, 38 Ill. App. 3d 645, 348 N.E.2d 507, 509 (1976) (must consider all
factors: cannot accurately predict changes); Breiner v. Breiner, 195 Neb. 143, 236 N.W.2d 846,
849 (1975) (must consider all attendant circumstances); Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72,
328 A.2d 625, 628, 75 A.L.R.3d 484, 488 (1974) (appropriate procedure is to establish a fixed dollar
award; many factors are to be considered and no modification should be made without judicial ap-
proval); Picker v. Vollenhover, 207 Or. 45, 290 P.2d 789, 801 (1954).
The petitioner's assertion in Mahalingam was that the award ignored most of the relevant factors in
determining the amount of support. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra. The argument, as
stated by the court, was that "an open-ended escalation award exclusively and impermissibly focuses
on the circumstances of the paying parent while ignoring the complex factors relating to the needs of
the child and the ability of the mother to pay support." 21 Wn. App. at 233, 584 P.2d at 975.
32. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
33. The arbitrariness of escalation clauses which fail to consider the child's needs and both par-
ents' ability to pay is the heart of the dissenting argument in In re Marriage of Mahalingam, 21 Wn.
App. at 237, 584 P.2d at 977 (Roe, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
34. Since the trial court had given full consideration to the parties' economic prospects and
needs, both present and future, in arriving at its award, the majority in Mahalingam saw no merit to
the contention that there had been an impermissible overemphasis of one factor. Id. at 235, 584 P.2d
at 977. Thus the court concluded the award was fair to all.
Case law in other jurisdictions also supports the conclusion that escalation clauses are not per se
invalid. A concern frequently voiced in the cases has been the failure of the specific escalation
clauses employed to keep the relevant factors in balance, and the tendency of the clauses to focus
solely on changes in the supporting spouse's income to the exclusion of other factors. McManus v.
McManus, 38 I11. App. 3d 645, 348 N.W.2d 507, 509 (1976) (future changes cannot be predicted
with accuracy and should not be anticipated); Stanaway v. Stanaway, 70 Mich. App. 294, 245
N.W.2d 723, 725 (1976) (escalation clause focused exclusively on paying parent). The reasoning of
these cases seems to permit escalation clauses if their singular focus is eliminated.
The only jurisdiction banning escalation has done so by narrowly construing a statutory provision
requiring that the award "specify what amount" to require a fixed sum. Newsome v. Newsome, 237
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D. Spousal Maintenance Distinguished
Escalation clauses have frequently been the subject of interpretation in
Washington spousal maintenance cases. In Washington, spousal mainte-
nance and child support are founded on fundamentally different policies.
Spousal maintenance is based on the policy that dissolution of the mar-
riage should be accomplished without unnecessary hardship to either
party; once reconciliation becomes impossible, the court's role is to di-
vide the property fairly and to provide for maintenance during the transi-
tion to self-supporting status. 35 The supreme court has emphatically
stated it is neither just nor equitable to give one spouse a perpetual lien on
the earnings of the other. 36
This policy of providing support only during the transition period is
reflected in a Washington statute authorizing the use of written separation
agreements. 37 The statute authorizes the parties to enter into a written
Ga. 221, 227 S.E.2d 347, 348-49 (1976). No other jurisdiction has gone this far, nor are there any
sound policy reasons for doing so.
Finally, several courts have specifically sanctioned escalation. Viles v. Viles, 316 F.2d 31, 34 (3d
Cir. 1963) (provisions for anticipated future changes held permissible; agreement was carefully at-
tuned to wide income fluctuations of supporting spouse); Spotts v. Spotts, 355 So. 2d 228, 229 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (escalation clause upheld where increase small, formula precise, time and
money saved for all parties, and modification still available); McIntyre v. McIntyre, [ 1979] 5 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2289, 2290 (the New York Family Court, in reversing a long line of cases, held that a
separation agreement with no provisions for changes in child support could not be fair when made or
in the future and was not binding against a modification request; provision must be made to assure
that the value of the original award remains constant over time); Wells v. Wells, 2 Or. App. 221, 467
P.2d 650, 651-52 (1970).
35. Lockhart v. Lockhart, 145 Wash. 210, 212-13, 259 P. 385, 386 (1927). The policy reflects
the doctrine that spousal maintenance is awarded not as a matter of right btlt only upon a showing of
need and only within the confines of the supporting spouse's ability to pay. Baker v. Baker. 80 Wn.
2d 736, 744, 498 P.2d 315, 320 (1972); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 297, 494 P.2d
208, 211 (1972).
36. Lockhart v. Lockhart, 145 Wash. 210, 212-13, 259 P. 385, 386 (1927), is the seminal case
as to the policy and law of spousal maintenance in Washington. The case stands for the propositions
that a divorce severs the marital relationship and that, except under rare circumstances, a divorced
spouse has no claim for perpetual support. Id. The Lockhart decision was subsequently criticized and
limited to its facts, and the court adopted the rule that alimony is permanent until a substantial change
in circumstances can be demonstrated. Warning v. Warning, 40 Wn. 2d 903, 905-06, 247 P.2d 249,
251 (1952); Bartow v. Bartow, 12 Wn. 2d 408, 412-13, 121 P.2d 962, 964 (1942); Underwood v.
Underwood, 162 Wash. 204, 208-09, 298 P. 318, 319 (1931).
In Morgan v. Morgan, 59 Wn. 2d 639, 369 P.2d 516 (1962), the court returned to the policy of
Lockhart and set forth a two-fold test for entitlement to maintenance: need and ability to pay. 59 Wn.
2d at 643, 369 P.2d at 518. This doctrine was codified in 1973. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.090
(1976). Spousal maintenance is still a matter of discretion rather than right, although the statute re-
moved marital fault as a factor and permitted consideration of the marital standard of living. See
Rieke, supra note 30, at 403.
37. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.070 (1976).
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agreement which provides for spousal maintenance and the division of
property, as well as for child custody, support, and visitation rights.
38
The separation agreement is binding upon the court if the provisions were
fair when executed, with the notable exception of provisions relating to
the children. The part of the agreement relating to spousal maintenance
and the division of property will be incorporated into a final dissolution
decree, and the agreement may, by its terms, limit or preclude all future
modifications. 39 The parties may not, however, impose such a limitation
on the provisions relating to the children. This difference in freedom to
modify the agreement reflects a basic difference in presumptions: chil-
dren are presumed to require support, while absent a contrary showing
spouses are presumed to be capable of providing for themselves.
This contrast in policy and presumptions, combined with the nonbind-
ing character of separation agreements over matters concerning children,
precludes the inference that because escalation clauses are valid in the
spousal support provisions of separation agreements, 40 they are also per-
missible in child support awards. Indeed, as long as the spousal mainte-
nance provisions in separation agreements are fair to both spouses, the
parties may limit the agreement's duration, prevent its modification, and
include whatever terms, including escalation, they desire. Child support,
on the other hand, must be based on specific factors, may not be based on
any one factor, and is inherently modifiable.
E. Rules and Policy Governing Modification Actions
Modification of child support awards is authorized by R.C.W. § 26.-
09.170.41 This statute establishes two prerequisites to modification: there
must be a change in circumstances and the change must be substantial. 42
In determining whether circumstances have changed the court looks to the
needs of the supported children and to the ability of the supporting spouse
to meet an increased support obligation.43 As a practical matter, the
38. Id. § 26.09.070 (1).
39. Id. § 26.09.070 (3), (5).
40. No Washington court has expressly upheld the validity of escalation provisions in spousal
maintenance awards. Their usage has been approved in dictum, however, Berry v. Berry, 50 Wn. 2d
158, 163-64, 310 P.2d 223, 226 (1957), and escalation clauses often appear in cases construing
spousal maintenance provisions. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
41. WAsH. Rav. CODE § 26.09.170 (1976). This statute also provides for the modification of
spousal maintenance awards. Id.
42. Id.
43. Lambert v. Lambert, 66 Wn. 2d 503, 508,403 P.2d 664, 667 (1965); Collins v. Collins, 12
Wn. App. 850, 852-54, 532 P.2d 1185, 1186-88 (1975).
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decision involves a reexamination, in view of subsequent changes, of the
factors considered in making the initial award. 4
The point at which a change becomes substantial is difficult to define
with precision. The apparent purposes of the substantial change require-
ment are to avoid wasteful litigation and to deter use of the courts for
harassment by constant petitioning for modification. 45 To effectuate these
purposes, the burden of producing evidence of substantial change is
placed on the petitioning party46 and a good faith claim is essential. 47 Fur-
ther, the substantiality requirement appears to be more stringent when the
supporting spouse rather than the child is the petitioner. 48
Some courts have found a direct conflict between statutory provisions
for modification and the use of escalation clauses. 49 The objection, in es-
sence, is that by providing a statutory procedure for modifying awards,
the legislature precluded devices which automatically adjust the amount
of support; the use of escalation clauses allegedly "impugns" the purpose
of the statute. 50
44. See Collins v. Collins, 12 Wn. App. 850, 854, 532 P.2d 1185, 1187-88 (1975). See also
text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
45. Viles v. Viles, 316 F.2d 31, 34 (3d Cir. 1963); Heuchan v. Heuchan, 38 Wn. 2d 207,
214-15, 228 P.2d 470, 474-75 (1951).
46. Corson v. Corson, 46 Wn. 2d 611, 614-15, 283 P.2d 673, 675 (1955).
47. A job change which the supporting spouse knew would reduce his income was held to be
insufficient basis for modification. Lambert v. Lambert, 66 Wn. 2d 503, 509-10, 403 P.2d 664,
667-68 (1965). However, a reduction in income caused by entering the army to serve as a doctor was
held to justify modification. Dillon v. Dillon, 21 Wn. 2d 311, 312-13, 150 P.2d 594, 594 (1944).
48. Modification was denied when requested by a supporting spouse who had assumed additional
responsibilities of a new marriage, Feek v. Feek, 187 Wash. 573, 581, 60 P.2d 686, 689 (1936), but
allowed in favor of a child upon a showing of increased needs and the negative effect of inflation on
the original award, Collins v. Collins, 12 Wn. App. 850, 854, 532 P.2d 1185, 1187-88 (1975).
Courts have, however, refused to modify child support awards when faced only with evidence of
inflation and increased earnings on the part of the payor. Fensterheim v. Fensterheim, 55 A.D.2d
516, 389 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (1976) (showing of increase in husband's earnings without a similar show-
ing of increase in child's needs is no warrant for modification); Dunn v. Wescott, 81 Misc. 2d 501,
366 N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (Fam. Ct. 1975) (evidence that the cost of living has increased is not suffi-
cient in itself to establish a substantial change); Fakouri v. Perkins, 322 So. 2d 401, 402 (La. Ct. of
App. 1975) (both parties affected equally by inflation).
It is noteworthy, however, that in none of these cases was a showing made of the impact of
inflation on the needs of the supported spouse or child. In Mahalingam the court took judicial notice
of inflation, 21 Wn. App. at 234, 584 P.2d at 976, and in a recent New York decision the Family
Court held that a decree which fails to make provision for inflation's effects is prima facie unfair,
McIntyre v. McIntyre [1979] 5 FAM. L. REp. (BNA) 2289, 2290.
49. Stanaway v. Stanaway, 70 Mich. App. 294, 245 N.W.2d 723, 724-25 (1976); Breiner v.
Breiner, 195 Neb. 143, 236 N.W.2d 846, 849 (1975); Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 328
A.2d 625, 627, 75 A.L.R.3d 484, 487 (1974).
50. In dealing with this argument the Mahalingam court stated: "The award does not impugn the
efficacy of [R.C.W. § 26.09.170] since petitioner may at any time seek modification of the support
award should a change occur in the circumstances which the court relied upon for the original decree
of support." In re Marriage of Mahalingam, 21 Wn. App. at 236, 584 P.2d at 977.
412
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The statutes and policy underlying the support system demonstrate the
weakness of this objection. Res judicata dictates that facts which could or
should have been considered in determining the initial award may not be
advanced to modify it.51 One factor to be considered in making the initial
award is the economic positions and prospects of both parents at the time
of the decree. 52 To the extent that evidence produced on this issue permits
a determination of future increases, the logic of res judicata mandates that
all such evidence be considered at the time the award is made. By incor-
porating an escalation clause into the support decree, the parties can ac-
count for evidence of future income increases.
Further, escalation is consistent with the policies underlying
modification. Resort to the courts should be had only when significant,
unforeseeable changes transpire; the potential for harassment, renewed
trauma, unnecessary expense, and use of court resources should be
avoided where possible. 53
Finally, escalation avoids the uncertainty of whether modification will
be allowed. Inflation's effect is not always deemed substantial by the
courts, 54 and the decision to modify is largely discretionary. 55 The use of
an escalation clause eliminates the need to rely on the court's discretion.
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO ESCALATION CLAUSES
A. Child Support Schedules in Washington Practice
In response to enormous caseloads and increasing costs, the King
County Superior Court adopted Local Rule 94.04(h), 56 authorizing tem-
porary child support awards in pending cases based on court-approved
schedules. 57 The schedules base the amount of support on a percentage of
51. Heuchan v. Heuchan, 38 Wn. 2d 207, 214, 228 P.2d 470,474-75 (1951). The Washington
court is uncertain as to the doctrinal basis (res judicata or equitable laches) for the rule but is con-
vinced that public policy mandates that facts which could have been considered in making the initial
award are unavailable as a basis for modification: Litigants should not be permitted to engage in a
"continual readjudication and reconsideration of their affairs." Id. at 215, 228 P.2d at 475. Accord,
Collins v. Collins, 12 Wn. App. 850, 853, 532 P.2d 1185, 1187 (1975).
52. Puckett v. Puckett, 76 Wn. 2d 703,705-06,458 P.2d 556, 557 (1969). See notes 28-30 and
accompanying text supra.
53. In re Marriage of Mahalingam, 21 Wn. App. at 236 n.10, 584 P.2d at 977 n.10. See notes
1-6 and accompanying text supra.
54. See note 48 supra.
55. Lambert v. Lambert, 66 Wn. 2d 503, 508, 403 P.2d 664, 667 (1965); Rehak v. Rehak, I
Wn. App. 963, 465 P.2d 687 (1970).
56. LocAL R. SuPER. CT. 94.04(h).
57. Kelly, supra note 1, at 5. See also WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.060 (1976) (authorizes tempo-
rary spousal maintenance and child support orders).
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the absent parent's income. The applicable percentage is determined ac-
cording to the number of children and the supporting spouse's income. 58
The schedules were the product of a study by Florence T. Hall, which
determined relative family spending patterns based on family size, in-
come, and the average cost for all ages of dependent children. 59 Although
the Hall support schedules were adopted only to guide the determination
of the amount of temporary support, they have become persuasive in fix-
ing final support awards. 60 The Hall schedules are not themselves
escalators, 6' but they could provide the basis for escalation if their per-
centages were incorporated into the decree to allow adjustments as in-
come increases.62
B. Percentage Escalation
A system of fixed-percentage escalation is capable of meeting both the
"necessary or reasonable" criteria of R.C.W. § 26.09.10063 and the
practical demands of simplicity and certainty. Percentage escalation can
reasonably take one of two forms; a fixed percentage of the supporting
spouse's income, or a base sum award to be annually increased by a fixed
percentage.
A fixed percentage of income approach could use the Hall data as its
empirical base. 64 Since the Hall schedule percentages were computed on
58. Hall, Child Support for Children of Dissolved Marriages, DiSSOLUTIoN UPDATE 26. at 31
(Law and Practice Series, Washington State Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 1976).
59. Id. at 26-27.
60. Kelly, supra note 1, at 6-7; New Child Support Schedule, SEATtLE-KING Cou-ry BAR BULL I
(Dec. 1974).
61. Kelly, supra note 1, at 21-22. Kelly stresses that the schedules are intended to assist the
court in determining the dollar amount to be included in the divorce decree or temporary support
order, but he recommends that the court consider some form of escalation to account for cost of living
and take-home pay increases. Id.
62. Escalation by incorporating the Hall support schedule percentages into support decrees is
distinguishable from the escalation at issue in In re Marriage of Mahalingam, 21 Wn. App. 228, 584
P.2d 971 (1978). The Hall schedules set a fixed percentage of income to be awarded, the percentage
being determined by the number of children and based on an empirical assessment of need and ability
to pay. In contrast, the formula in Mahalingam escalated the amount awarded by a percentage of
income increases rather than using the total income as the basis for escalation, and the percentage
itself was variable and unrelated to any empirical determination of need and ability to support. The
basis of Justice Roe's dissent on this issue in Mahalingam was this absence of a rational basis for the
escalation formula. Indeed, he did not object to percentage support payments, but only to "auto-
matic, percentage escalation in the future, without regard to need and ability to pay." Id. at 237, 584
P.2d at 978 (Roe, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
63. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.100 (1976).
64. Hall, supra note 58, at 31-32. The percentage of a supporting spouse's income awarded
under the Hall support schedules depends upon the number of children up to four: for one child the
payment is 24% of income, for two children it is 35%, for three children it is 42%, and for four
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the basis of family consumption budgets for goods and services across a
variety of income levels and family compositions, they reflect many of
the considerations demanded by the award statute and the Washington
Supreme Court,65 and thus avoid the unfairness and arbitrariness of un-
duly emphasizing one factor in the child support equation to the exclusion
;of all others.
Percentage-of-income escalation is also simple and definite. 66 A fixed
percentage applied annually to net income yields a definite monthly
amount. By defining net income as income after federal tax and other
mandatory and standard 67 deductions, the Hall schedules also avoid dis-
putes over permissible deductions and potential manipulation of in-
come.
68
Alternatively, a decree could award a base sum, determined by consid-
ering the relevant factors, 69 and set a fixed percentage by which the base
sum would be annually increased. 70 The data for this approach could be
obtained from a study by Philip Eden. 71 Eden gathered pre- and post-
dissolution data concerning the income of both spouses, composition of
the households, and relative allocation of family budgets. 72 He also stud-
ied changes in budget needs as children mature. 73 From this data he de-
veloped guidelines for setting the initial support amount 74 and for deter-
mining the extent of future increases. Eden concluded that future
increases in child support are necessitated by inflation and by the increas-
children it is 48%. The schedules apply these percentages to net monthly income, ranging between
$300 and $2,500 at fifty dollar intervals, to arrive at dollar amounts for an award. Omitting the last
step and simply placing one of the percentages into the decree in accordance with the number of
children to be supported automatically provides for escalation.
65. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
66. See notes 81-85 and accompanying text infra (discussion of enforceability of judgment prob-
lems where escalation clauses indefinite).
67. Hall, supra note 58, at 31. The standard deduction has been replaced by the zero bracket
amount. I.R.C. § 63(d) (1976).
68. Hall, Proposed Support Schedules for Children of Divorced Parents, SEATrLE-KIN COUNTY
BAR BULL. 4, 7 (Dec. 1974).
69. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
70. For example, an award of $200 per month could be increased annually by 5%; after one year
the monthly amount would be $210 (5% x 200 = 10), after two years it would be $220.50 (5% x
210), and so on.
71. P. EDEN, supra note 4.
72. Id. at 36.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 37-51. Eden is careful to note the limitations of economic analysis iiarriving at sup-
port awards. Most significantly, low income places the parties in a "no win" situation. If, after the
award, the supporting spouse is left with income below the poverty level, he may leave the
jurisdiction. However, to hold down the award to keep him above the poverty level leaves an inade-
quate amount for the custodial spouse and children, who may then be eligible for relief assistance. Id.
at 37.
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ing cost of children as they mature, and that such increases should be pro-
vided for if permitted by income increases of the noncustodial spouse. 75
Eden concluded that four options regarding future increases were avail-
able; not increasing the base amount; increasing it on the basis of the
child's age; increasing it on the basis of child's age and inflation; and fi-
nally, increasing it on the basis of age, inflation, and projected increases
in the supporting spouses's income. 76 Increasing a base sum by a fixed
percentage is a simple and certain escalation device since it requires
merely multiplying the current base amount by a fixed percent at a speci-
fied time each year.77
C. Limitations of Escalation
Limitations as well as benefits inhere in any type of escalation device.
Support schedules, no matter how accurate generally, reflect only statisti-
cal norms and are in constant tension with demands for individualized
treatment. Support schedules or percentages ought not be mechanically
applied in every case, but should be treated as generalized guidelines
against which the parties can evaluate their own positions.78 If the parties
fit the norm, the schedules can be applied without alteration; if they do
not, alterations can be made to accommodate particular needs.
75. Id. at 52-57.
76. Id. at 53-54. In analyzing the four options, Eden concluded that not increasing the base
amount was inherently inadequate and flatly rejected it. Increases on the basis of the child's age
would be acceptable if prices and incomes were static but, since they are not, Eden rejected this
option as well. Eden conceded that option three, which allows for children's growth and price infla-
tion, is difficult in a period of sharp inflation, but he concluded that even a conservative inflation
factor of 3% (half the 6% of the past decade) would afford some protection against erosion of an
award's purchasing power. To this 3% Eden added a 2% increase for children's growth. The fourth
option, which also accounts for the reasonably probable increase in the income of the noncustodial
spouse, approximates what the child would have received had the divorce not occurred. This poses
the same problem of imprecision as does option three, and works only where incomes are high or
both parents work. Id.
77. This approach also provides guidelines for determining the base amount of support. This
should assist the courts in properly weighing the relevant factors and should avoid the current prob-
lem of wide variances in awards for similarly situated children. See generally Comment, Calculation
of Child Support in Pennsylvania, 81 DICK. L. REv. 793 (1977); White & Howlman, Models for
Court Use in Divorce Cases, 52 FLA. B.J. 179 (1978).
78. P. EDEN, supra note 4, at 63. As Eden cautioned:
It is not the author's intention to provide a mechanical device. Rather it is hoped that the process
of establishing the statistical norms and guidelines and listing the alternative ways of approach-
ing the problems of awarding child and spousal support will help all those who are involved to
arrive at more informed decisions.
Id. While Eden acknowledged the reluctance of parties and judges tb speculate as to the future, he
concluded that the alternative of no increase will always fail the test of time, while a schedule may be




Another potential limitation of escalation clauses is the inability to ob-
tain enforcement of judgments containing such clauses 79 and the refusal
of foreign courts to afford them full faith and credit. 80 To the extent that
the amount owing in a judgment is indefinite because it is subject to con-
stant fluctuation, local courts cannot enforce the judgment and foreign
courts will not recognize it. 81 Since judgments can be enforced only when
the amount owing is clear on the face of the decree, some courts have
held that escalation clauses providing for periodic adjustments based on a
formula or index are invalid. 82 Many courts, including the Washington
Court of Appeals, 83 reject the indefiniteness argument if the amount due
and owing is periodically calculated on a given date by the mechanical
application of a predetermined formula.84 Once the calculation is made,
all parties are on notice of the amount of the obligation, which remains
constant until a subsequent calculation is made. Since the amount is at all
times fixed and certain and the formula itself is not subject to change,
court enforcement of such an award involves no more uncertainty than an
accounting action to enforce a judgment for a sum certain. 85
IV. CONCLUSION
The present practice 86 of awarding child support without providing for
inevitable and predictable increases in future needs offends the policy of
79. The reason R.C.W. § 26.09.170 permits only future installments to be modified is to entitle
the judgments to full faith and credit. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 109,
Comments a, c (1971); REsTATEMENr OF JUDGMENTS § 41, Comment a (1942). Considering the present
mobility of Americans, enforceability in other jurisdictions of judgments for support is a matter of
major importance.
80. See note 81 and accompanying text infra.
81. For example, in Picker v. Vollenhover, 207 Or. 45, 290 P.2d 789 (1955), the court refused
to give full faith and credit to an Illinois support order because the judgment was tied to the support-
ing spouse's income and therefore susceptible to increases or decreases. Because facts outside the
judgment were necessary to determine the amount owing, the court found it to be indefinite and re-
fused to acknowledge it. Id. at 799-801. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text infra (discussion of
whether escalation clauses are too indefinite to be enforced).
82. Taylor v. Taylor, 367 S.W.2d 58, 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Breiner v. Breiner, 195 Neb.
143, 236 N.W.2d 846, 848 (1975); Picker v. Vollenhover, 207 Or. 45, 290 P.2d 789, 799 (1955).
83. In re Marriage of Mahaingam, 21 Wn. App. at 236, 584 P.2d at 977.
84. E.g., Golden v. Golden, 230 Ga. 867, 199 S.E.2d 796, 797-98 (1973); Vollenhover v. Vol-
lenhover, 4 Ill. App. 2d 44, 123 N.E.2d 114, 115 (1954); Sheldrup v. Gaffney, 243 Iowa 1297, 55
N.W.2d 272, 276 (1952).
85. In re Marriage of Mahalingam, 21 Wn. App. at 236, 584 P.2d at 977.
86. The Subcommittee on Escalation Clauses of the King County Family Law Committee
recently recommended against the automatic use of escalation clauses in child support decrees. Min-
utes of Seattle-King County Family Law Comm. Meeting (Sept. 21, 1979) (on file with Washington
Law Review). The subcommittee was considering a proposed court rule providing for mandatory es-
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providing adequate child support at the least cost to all parties and to the
judicial process. Percentage escalation clauses are an effective method of
anticipating increases in future needs; if a prediction is inaccurate and re-
sults in hardship, the award can be modified.
While the Washington Supreme Court has not yet addressed the propri-
ety of escalation clauses in child support awards, the policies and statu-
tory provisions involved in making and modifying child support awards
justify the use of escalation clauses. Percentage escalation provisions are
fully consistent with Washington law and policy, and should be common
components of child support awards.
Michael E. Gossler
calation clauses. It rejected the proposed rule on two grounds. First, it would foster unnecessary liti-
gation because parties will file to quash the automatic increases. Second, automatic increases "do not
give adequate consideration to any relevant factors including remaTriage, changes in the asset/debt
picture of either party, unusual increases of expenses for the non-custodial spouse and so forth," Id.
at 1.
The proposed court rule is distinguishable from the escalation proposed in this comment because
the rule mandates escalation clauses in all child support decrees; escalation as here proposed is not
mandatory. In cases where changes affecting the ability to pay support are forseeable escalation
should not be provided, or should await the outcome of the uncertainty. Furthermore, the frequency
and impact of unforseeable changes affecting the supporting spouse's ability to pay escalated support
must be balanced against inflation's impact on child support awards. Every child stands to lose with-
out escalation, but not every supporting spouse will experience the concerns the committee ex-
pressed. Where an inability to pay escalated support is not forseeable, child support escalation should
be provided for; if hardship to the supporting spouse results, modification is always available.
